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FORUM
HISTORIANS AND THE NEW ORIGINALISM:
CONTEXTUALISM, HISTORICISM,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
FOREWORD
Martin S. Flaherty*
INTRODUCTION
Little appreciated, in an otherwise greatly appreciated opinion, is Justice
Robert Jackson’s lyrical rejection of originalism in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.1 There, he waxed that “just what our forefathers did
envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions,
must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph
was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. . . . [T]hey largely cancel each
other.”2 He deftly underlined the point with a footnote demonstrating how
two of the most prominent Founders, who were also two of the three
personalities that made up “Publius” (the author of The Federalist)—James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton—utterly disagreed with one another
about the Constitution’s meaning as soon as major controversies arose.3
Yet, as with Mark Twain, the announcement of originalism’s death has
proven to be premature. As this forum shows, whatever else originalism is,
it is alive and well. Fortunately, the Essays in this forum come from
historians. As such, the contributions issue from the very discipline on
which originalism’s claims depend. Precisely that insight serves as the
dominant, though not necessarily unanimous, theme of this collection.
From this insight comes ways to confine originalism to a possibly
legitimate, but far more circumscribed, role than its adherents desire.
Toward that end, this Foreword addresses three matters. First, it
considers why the use of history in constitutional interpretation is
inescapable. Next, it suggests that the Essays in this forum do not go far
enough in debunking the idea of “public meaning” originalism as a serious
* Leitner Family Professor of International Human Rights, Fordham University School of
Law; Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
Princeton University. My thanks to Chris Pioch for his invaluable research assistance.
1. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2. Id. at 634–35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 635 n.1.
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alternative to previous approaches. Finally, the balance of this Foreword
reviews the also perhaps inescapable misuses of history that constitutional
interpretation invites and considers the type of misuse that public meaning
originalism represents.
I. HISTORY TRIUMPHANT
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once wrote that “a page of history is worth a
volume of logic.”4 Nowhere has that adage been applied more consistently
than in the pages of the U.S. Reports. Historical arguments have featured in
constitutional interpretation from the Supreme Court’s earliest decisions.
Just as Justice Jackson’s dismissal of originalism is overlooked in
Youngstown, so too is Chief Justice John Marshall’s embrace of the
approach in Marbury v. Madison.5 Typically, commentators focus on
Marbury’s use of text and structure. Yet there, almost in passing, Marshall
justifies the primacy of constitutional law, stating:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to
their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has
been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion;
nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles,
therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority,
from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are
designed to be permanent.6

Marshall offered no citations for the proposition, probably because he
personally participated in the events on which he relied, one reason why
this originalist aspect of Marbury evades attention.
Two hundred years later, justices relying on history cite to Founding
sources, and they do so obsessively, regardless of political bent. Recent
opinions relying heavily on the history of particular constitutional
provisions include: Zivotofsky v. Kerry,7 Medellín v. Texas,8 District of
Columbia v. Heller,9 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,10 Boumediene v. Bush,11
Printz v. United States,12 New York v. United States,13 Harmelin v.
Michigan,14 Morrison v. Olson,15 INS v. Chadha,16 and others.
As Jonathan Gienapp notes, originalism’s modern incarnation comes
from the efforts of conservative advocates and scholars dating back to the
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Id. at 176.
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
552 U.S. 491 (2008).
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
501 U.S. 957 (1991).
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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Reagan Administration.17 Though sometimes overlooked, progressive
scholars and advocates in short order countered with originalist and/or
historical arguments of their own. So dominant has the turn to history been
that Randy Barnett only slightly overstated his proclamation that
originalism has triumphed.18 Given this reality, constitutional lawyers cede
historical arguments to the opposing side at their peril.
II. THE PROMISE OF PUBLIC MEANING
None of this is to say that originalism’s path to dominance has been easy
or ultimately a good thing. At every step it has met significant challenges.
Public meaning originalism, which the Essays in this forum address, is
simply the most recent attempt to salvage the approach from those
challenges. These Essays rightly suggest that the public-meaning gambit
will not just fail to meet some of the more serious objections that
originalism faces. They also rightly suggest that, if anything, this new
incarnation of the method robs it of whatever legitimacy it might otherwise
claim. If these responses have any weakness, it is that they do not venture
far—or, more accurately, deeply—enough.
The first assaults on modern originalism were mainly fought on the fields
of theory. Responding to Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr. set the terms of popular debate, arguing that at the
end of the day, constitutional interpretation should be about justice rather
than democratic dead-hand control.19 Prominent constitutional theorists,
sometimes grouped under the banner of “justice seeking,” elaborated
Brennan’s objections.20 Among other things, they argued that the
Constitution’s legitimacy lay not in the will of the long dead majorities who
ratified its provisions, but rather in the justice and moral authority of the
principles that those provisions enshrined.21 Just for this reason, theoretical
opponents in originalism debates tended to talk past each other. Either the
Constitution rested on the democratic authority of “We the People,”
expressed through ratification, or it rested on principles of fundamental
justice. Competing sets of these first principles tend to result in a stalemate.
Enter the historians, whose objections tended to be less fundamental but
more threatening. It did not take long before those suspicious of Reaganera originalism noted that its practitioners attributed original intentions to
the Founders that invariably supported modern conservative positions. That
suspicion only grew once legal scholars turned either to historians or to the
17. See generally Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching
Symposium at Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTERCENTURY OF DEBATE 55, 55–70 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007); Attorney General Edwin
Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in ORIGINALISM: A
QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE, supra, at 47, 47–54.
18. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613
(1999).
19. Brennan, supra note 17, at 57–58, 70.
20. See Martin Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565, 1565–66
(1997).
21. Id.
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historical sources themselves. The result was several damning objections,
even conceding originalism’s theoretical underpinnings.
The first set of objections was what I long ago categorized as
“procedural.”22 These stem from a proposition that all but one of the
contributors to this forum take as a given. That is, when a legal advocate
invokes the authority of a separate discipline to add weight to her legal
argument, it follows that the advocate has no choice other than to play by
the rules of that separate discipline. Take, for example, a claim about tort
law based upon a scientific proposition. The legal claim derives additional
weight only to the extent that the scientific claim rests upon recognized
scientific procedures. To say, therefore, that the rules of one discourse
should not be imposed upon another gets the matter exactly wrong. The
practitioners of one discipline—constitutional law—seek to strengthen their
arguments with the conclusions drawn from another discipline—
constitutional history. They do so on the belief that historically based
arguments provide authority that legal assertions cannot alone. The
additional weight derives precisely because the two forms of discourse are
different. An argument for a “unitary” executive may proceed solely based
on conventional legal materials, such as text or inference from structure.
When, however, a supporter of that position further contends that the
“Founding generation” in some way supported this position, assuming such
support is a good and weighty thing, then it tends to matter whether the
Founders actually did any such thing—especially when it turns out that they
did not.23
It follows that the external authority that history affords depends upon
following at least the basic procedural rules that history demands. These
may be briefly stated. As Jack Rakove24 and Saul Cornell25 in particular
emphasize, first is a concern for context. Without understanding how
different the past can be, misconstruing words or deeds through modern
eyes becomes almost inevitable. A perhaps counterintuitive corollary is
reliance on the secondary works of professional historians, who have the
time and training to scour original sources that even legal academics do not.
Only after this should anyone, especially lawyers, venture into the thickets
of primary sources, and they should be scrupulous about reviewing all
relevant material, broadly defined. The need to cast a wide net raises a
further basic stricture: anyone consulting history must be open to the
likelihood of complexity.26 Jack Rakove himself nicely captured the idea
when he titled his book on the framing and ratification as Original

22. Martin Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 523, 554–55 (1995).
23. Id.
24. Jack Rakove, Tone Deaf to the Past: More Qualms About Public Meaning
Originalism, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 972–73 (2015).
25. Saul Cornell, “To Assemble Together for Their Common Good”: History,
Ethnography, and the Original Meanings of the Rights of Assembly and Speech, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 917 (2015).
26. See Flaherty, supra note 22, at 550–52.
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Meanings,27 plural. By these standards, not surprisingly, much first-wave
originalist work fared poorly.
But the historical challenge did not end there. Substantively, scholars
and even judges pursuing sound historical method discovered just the type
of complexity that a good historian would expect from a nationwide debate
about an untested frame of government open to numerous interpretations.
Consider, for example, separation of powers. Here Justice Antonin Scalia
set the terms for the initial originalist case by claiming that the Founders
more or less all understood the precise scope of “Executive Power” in
Article II, including the exclusive power to remove federal officers.28
Several legal scholars ostensibly confirmed the historical case. Studies
adhering to even the most basic historical methods quickly revealed that no
such Founding-era consensus existed. While the Founders did generally
embrace separation of powers as a basic idea, they wildly disagreed on what
it meant with regard to numerous “details,” such as removal of federal
officers.29
Occasionally, the substantive challenges that historians and historyminded advocates mounted went beyond demonstrating complexity and
found consensus that was diametrically opposed to the positions that many
conservative originalists put forward. Perhaps the best example here is the
Declare War Clause.30 Certain originalists sought to demonstrate that the
original intent of the provision sought merely to give Congress the power to
announce that the nation was formerly in a state of war, rather than the
exclusive power to authorize the President to introduce troops into
hostilities. Closer historical scrutiny, however, did more than show simply
that the Founding generation held many views on the subject that
“cancel[ed] each other.”31 Rather, the overwhelming weight of secondary
studies themselves, relying on both a reconstruction of historical context
and close examination of the primary sources, concluded that there was a
clearly dominant view of the Declare War Clause—to grant Congress the
power to authorize the use of troops except in certain emergency situations
during which it was not in session.32
In the face of these challenges, originalists might have simply moderated
their initial claim. They might have conceded that history generally will not
furnish one clear original understanding and that when it does, the
understanding might not confirm the modern result that they expected or
desired. These sensible concessions, however, may have ceded too much
ground to originalism’s “original vision.”

27. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS (1996).
28. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 703–04.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
31. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–35, 635 n.1 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
32. See, e.g., William M. Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 715 (1997).
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Perhaps for this reason, originalism instead rebranded itself in a way that
claimed to obviate the challenges that issued from history as a discipline.
This was a shift from “original intention” to “original understanding,”
which ultimately came to be defined as a quest for the original public
meaning. The goal would no longer be to seek the subjective intentions and
motivations of James Madison, James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton,
Gouverneur Morris, or other Founders, either at the ratification debates or at
the closed Federal Convention. That search got inevitably bogged down in
just what historians prized: placing individual Founders in the context of
their day, looking at the numerous personalities who participated, and
accepting the complexity and confusion that often resulted. Public meaning
promised to cut the historical Gordian knot. The goal would now be to fix
the meaning of a constitutional provision by asking how a literate member
of the public would have understood its words at the time. In theory, this
approach might often require no more than consulting a contemporary
dictionary to unlock the operative meaning of “executive,” “commerce,” or
“due process.”
Each of the contributions to this forum demonstrates that, when it comes
to history’s demands, public meaning originalists can run, but they cannot
hide. Helen Irving correctly doubts whether judges are up to relying on
history as a dispositive authority at all, but argues that because they will try
anyway, they should be held accountable to some historical standards.33
With prodigious sophistication, Jonathan Gienapp convincingly argues that
attempts to base public meaning on linguistic philosophers such as Grice
are, among other things, inapposite.34 Saul Cornell both practices and
preaches rigorous historical method with a compelling account of the use of
liberty poles during the Whiskey Rebellion and with not just a contextual
approach, but also an anthropological approach, reviews contemporary
attitudes—plural—toward free speech.35 Most simply, Jack Rakove rightly
asserts that almost any historical claim that ignores context, inclusion, and
complexity will not be credible and that seeking the range of meanings that
a literate American might have attributed to the Constitution in 1788 or
1791 is not different.36
Each of these authors counters the public meaning narrative
convincingly. Yet there remains an even more basic objection: What basis
would there be to believe that the understanding of a randomly selected
participant in either the framing or formal ratification debates of the
Constitution would be any different from the understanding of a randomly
selected, literate member of the general public?
Consider this thought experiment. Two New Yorkers and a Virginian
walk into a bar. The first New Yorker is Alexander Hamilton, the Virginian
33. Helen Irving, Outsourcing the Law: History and the Disciplinary Limits of
Constitutional Reasoning, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 962 (2015).
34. Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 945 (2015).
35. See generally Cornell, supra note 25.
36. Rakove, supra note 24.
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is James Madison, and the bar into which they walk is owned by the other
New Yorker, Samuel Fraunces. Assume they all read the first clause of the
new Constitution’s Article II. Hamilton, an advocate of a strong executive,
reads it expansively, though not as expansively as many presidentialist
originalists assume. Madison, more circumspect, comes to read it more
narrowly. Each Founder takes the core meaning of the “Executive Power”
vested in the President as implementing the laws passed by Congress.
Hamilton, however, interprets it to mean a power to proclaim neutrality,
though he gets there through an expansive reading of other specific grants
of power in Article II.37 Madison soon makes clear that he opposes any
such unwarranted expansion of what the Chief Executive may do.38 And
what about Samuel Fraunces, our proxy for a literate member of the general
public? Without any specific information, we might speculate that he
understands executive power as no more or less than enforcing the laws. Or
he might read it to include more additional powers, such as a power to
proclaim neutrality, or an exclusive power to terminate treaties or remove
federal officeholders.39
The point is that there is no reason to think that, where the well-known
Founders entertained a range of views on a provision, issue, or question, a
literate member of the public at the time would have held any views outside
that range. In fact, given that the general public outnumbered the elite
Founders by the tens of thousands, there is every reason to believe that the
range of possible meanings literate members of the public had would have
been broader, with idiosyncratic views at the margins. And where the elite
Founders might have agreed on one precise meaning, such as the
requirement that a President be at least “thirty-five years old,” it is likely
such a provision would have held the same meaning for the general public.
Only if we assumed that the Framers at the Convention or the Founders at
the ratification debates were speaking in a secret Masonic code known only
to them would we have any basis to think that the range of subjective
intentions that they had concerning a given provision would significantly
diverge from the public meaning understood by publicans such as Samuel
Fraunces. At the end of the day, the Hamiltons and Madisons are merely a
subset of literate members of the general public.
All of which means that the challenges of finding the original intention(s)
of the Framers at Philadelphia, the original understanding(s) of the
Founders at the ratification debates, or the public meaning(s) of a provision
that prevailed at a good ale house would yield appreciably different results.
Each task is by definition historical—and valuable to originalists only to the
extent it is historical—and so subject to historical procedures and
37. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 590–91 (2004).
38. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling over
Presidential Power Outside the Courts, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 21, 38 (Curtis A.
Bradley & Christopher H. Schroeder eds., 2009).
39. For an account of Fraunces, see KYM S. RICE, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
FRAUNCES TAVERN: THE 18TH CENTURY (1985).
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methodology. That means doing the hard work of considering context,
breadth, and, more often than not, complexity.
The contributions to this forum nonetheless mount a powerful case
against sparing originalism from historical scrutiny by way of public
meaning. They may not make the threshold point that the original
intentions of the Founders would not likely diverge from the original
understandings of the American public. Even so, Cornell, Gienapp, Irving,
and Rakove provide compelling reasons why the search for pubic meaning
requires the same historical rigor as the quest for the Founders’ intentions.
III. HISTORIES ABUSED
This collective refutation, however, might go further. This forum
suggests that public meaning originalism is bad, but does not explain how
bad. This question suggests flipping the usual point/counterpoint between
originalists and their historian critics. As noted, the story has largely
consisted of originalists advancing claims, historians responding with
skepticism, and originalists countering with modified approaches. Yet
historians might make a more effective contribution if they turned the
tables. In particular, historians might affirmatively chronicle different types
of originalism to the extent they consistently do or do not fail to offer
credible historical accounts to support their constitutional claims. A more
precise definition of the problem might in theory lead to more effective
responses.
With this in mind, let me advance certain pathologies identified
elsewhere,40 but that will be further developed here. First is what is widely
known as “law office” history.41 This practice entails relying on historical
sources, usually selectively, when they are perceived to support
preconceived results.42 Typically, “law office” history involves using
quotations and other materials often wrenched out of context.43
More subtle, and today perhaps more prevalent, is what I once ago
designated as history “lite.”44 The allusion to a then-popular beer campaign
referred to historical arguments that were not as rigorous as “full-bodied”
history, but were just as “satisfying” as any historian’s account. History lite
implies a genuine attempt to find historical answers, yet an attempt that is
nonetheless undercut by the different demands of legal advocacy that Irving
recounts.45 Legal advocacy leaves lawyers and judges little time to become
immersed in a subject outside the law. What applies to lawyers, moreover,
also applies to legal scholars. Law professors usually have to produce more
40. Martin S. Flaherty, Can the Quill Be Mightier than the Uzi?: History “Lite,” “Law
Office” and Worse Meets the Second Amendment, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming Dec.
2015).
41. Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New
Boss, Same As the Old Boss”, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1098 (2009).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Flaherty, supra note 22, at 552–53.
45. Irving, supra note 33, at 961.
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pieces on more varied topics in less time than their counterparts in history.
They can do this because they typically submit their work to student-edited
reviews rather than peer-reviewed journals. The result is that there is very
little to filter shoddy historical work.46
Perhaps most pernicious, though ultimately more readily detected, is a
further misuse of history that I more recently termed history “bullshit.” The
term as applied refers to a minor bestselling essay by Princeton philosophy
professor Harry Frankfurt entitled, On Bullshit.47 Frankfurt rejected the
common definition of the term as a false statement. He argued instead that
the idea had a more nihilistic meaning as a claim that was indifferent to
whether truth or falsehood existed in the first place. According to
Frankfurt, cable and radio talk shows, social media, and other outlets create
an insatiable need for bullshit because the premium is to fill time with
claims that are merely provocative rather than true.48 Applied to
originalism, the idea means an assertion about the past that ultimately has
no concern for whether the claim is correct or incorrect, but instead
considers whether the claim offers the kinds of originality, boldness, and
cleverness that lead either to academic or Article III life tenure.
CONCLUSION
Where does “public meaning” originalism fall? As is true of many legal
inquiries, the answer is, “it depends.” Consider three originalists who argue
that “the right of the people to bear arms” had an original public meaning of
an individual right to own and carry guns. One does so already convinced
that the Second Amendment protects such a right, and so genuinely reads
“bear” and “carry” as synonymous, based either on a presentist reading or a
source—perhaps a dictionary entry—that confirms the preconception, never
bothering to subject the conclusion to more rigorous historical scrutiny.
Such would be classic “law office” history. Another originalist may
attempt a real historical inquiry but, due to the constraints of time or
perspective, simply fail to understand the importance of the eighteenthcentury militia system in relation to the concept of bearing arms for military
use only after sufficient training and drilling. Still, one more originalist
may be indifferent to what Founding attitudes were altogether, but refer to
them anyway en route to making a clever or provocative argument that
includes an individual right to own pistols, assault weapons, or even
drones.49
The problem with public meaning originalism, as with its predecessors, is
that it invites all three pathologies. As each of the contributors makes clear,
it offers a way to invoke history without actually doing history. This
promise makes it all too easy to believe that the past genuinely supports
one’s present agenda, to believe that a good faith but insufficient inquiry
46. See Flaherty, supra note 22, at 552–53.
47. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005).
48. Id. passim.
49. For a concise, historically rigorous account of the Second Amendment by a
nonhistorian, see MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY (2014).

914

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

clearly supports a particular result, or to make provocative arguments that
invoke the past on the theory that no one will or should look at the past too
closely. As such, public meaning originalism ought to be recognized for
the many ways that the promise it offers is false. Professors Cornell,
Gienapp, Irving, and Rakove deserve kudos for helping to make this clear.

